This is a preliminary version. Please do not cite without agreement of the authors. All comments warmly welcome.
Introduction
Eastern Europe was once a region with a high standard of living, even in comparison to Western Europe. Van Zanden (1999) found that wages expressed as the purchasing power of grain were higher in the Polish cities of Warsaw and Krakow during the 16 th and early 17 th centuries (and in Lviv, which is in today's West Ukraine, during the 16 th century) than in many Western European locations. 1 Using anthropometric indices, Baten (2005, 2008) found Northern and Eastern European health and nutrition levels to have been more favorable than those of Western and Southern Europe.
According to estimates in Koepke and Baten (2005, In an attempt to answer these and related questions, we will study the development of numeracy in this region. Numeracy is clearly a core component of human capital, especially in agricultural societies, in which decisions about the timing of activities had to take a number of issues into account, such as the weather, the status of 1 Of course, the cities for which evidence is available may not be representative for all of Eastern Europe. In fact, in our conclusion we will argue that western and central Poland, to which they refer, still had a remarkably high level of numeracy in the early 17 th century, which was different in other regions. 2 During the 17th century, heights among Eastern European started to decline to a dramatic extent, however. These sources allow us to estimate numeracy in several regions of what is today Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Russia. The application of age-heaping-based numeracy estimates to this newly available data set is performed here for the first time for such a large region and the time frame (but see Mironov 1991 and Kaiser and Peyton 1993 on Russian samples). Given the regional character of our sources, we decided to aggregate the numeracy estimates using today's national borders rather than historical empires or other regional units. This will allow for the comparison of the estimates with other historical evidence in the future (such as GDP estimates, anthropometric welfare, and other indicators).
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. We first review some findings and hypotheses of the previous literature regarding the reasons why Eastern Europe 4 lagged behind Western Europe in educational and welfare levels. In the second section, we present our new data set and explain its capabilities and limitations. In Section 3, we briefly explain the age-heaping methodology, as well as some caveats and doubts scholars may have about it. We also provide some of the responses to potential criticism of age-heaping proponents. In Section 4, we report the results at the regional level and present a method that can be used to adjust for regional biases. Finally, in Section 5, we present the national estimates for the five Eastern European countries since the 17 th century, and compare these estimates with evidence from Western and Southern Europe.
Finally, we present a tentative discussion of the implications of our findings for our understanding of early modern economic growth.
Review of the literature
In his study of literacy rates around 1800, Reis (2005) reported substantially lower values for Hungary (six percent), which is the only Eastern (or Central-Eastern) country he documented. This value was substantially lower than in other European countries. A very long-run study on Russian literacy was performed by Mironov (1991 Plakans and Wetherell 2005 , Szołtysek 2004 , 2007 , 2008a , 2008b , Szołtysek and Zuber-Goldstein 2010 c) The second serfdom hypothesis is another classic in the economic history literature (Kula, 1976; Millward 1982; Cerman 2008; Ogilvie and Edwards 2000) . In particular, historical Poland and Russia have been regarded as typical cases of noble landlordism and village subjection (Hagen, 1998; also Mironov, 1996 (Szołtysek 2008a (Szołtysek , 2008b .
As a minor digression from the literature review, we will look briefly at the regional distribution of serfs, as opposed to free or manumitted persons, and people on government-owned estates.
An overwhelming majority of the population of all of the territories under investigation lived in personal and hereditary subjection up until the 19th-century 8 reforms, with their property rights limited to an indeterminate leasehold. This fact notwithstanding, it has been observed that the share of hereditary or emphyteutic freeholders, or peasants holding more advantageous property rights, diminished considerably and progressively when moving into Polish eastern territories and Russia (Rutkowski, 1986; Moon 1999 ). If we consider the distribution in the share of serfs in the Russian Empire during mid-19 th century, a clear regional pattern also emerges ( Figure   4 ). 4 Especially in a central corridor between Belarus (Minsk) and Nishniy Novgorod, the share of serfs was particularly large. In contrast, the thinly populated regions in the Northeast had few serfs, and the same is true for the Southeast. Moreover, the Southeast was characterized during the late serfdom period by the slightly less oppressive system of Barshchina, in which feudal obligations were paid in money or kind, whereas the corvée system of compulsory labor was more typical in other regions. The share of serfs actually corresponds quite well to the regional distribution of numeracy and literacy (Figure 2 and 3).
d) Large-farm agriculture is often associated with a political economy in which large landowners prevented tax-financed public schooling, as they saw no need for serfs to learn (and perhaps demand political rights) in schools financed by the taxes of the rich.
Similar considerations apply to agricultural laborers later on, after the abolition of serfdom.
9 dominated by the landed interests of its nobility. Hence, investment in schooling was not very high on the national agenda, at until the empire lost the Crimean War. During this major event, not just the military inferiority of Russia, but also the empire's backwardness in terms of productivity and human capital became obvious. Thereafter, the government implemented reforms which also initiated a trend towards investing in larger-scale schooling.
f) The long-run consequences of wars and civil wars might have been a risk aversion among the population regarding investments of any sort. The terrible damage caused by the mid-17 th -century wars, soon repeated during the 1720s, brought the development of the manorial economy and the land-labor ratio to levels not very different to those of the late 17th century; i.e., at the beginning of the agrarian change (Szołtysek 2008a (Szady 2010, 228-250) . Even there, however, religiously mixed communities or regions could be found, with the peasantry dominated by Uniates (and later members of the Orthodox faith), and not seldom intermingled with islets of Polishspeaking minor nobility. There was also a substantial Jewish population. Similarly important in this context could be the competition between the Uniates and the Orthodox believers, on the one hand; and the Catholics and the Protestants on the other (Mitterauer 2003 ).
Some of these potential determinants will be discussed below using interregional comparisons, while others will be discussed using East-West comparisons. However, the aim of the present paper is not to perform a regression in which these potential explanations are systematically tested against each other.
Sources
Our sources are: (1) In Table 1 , we report on the places and regions for which evidence is available. In the second column, we list the country in which the regional unit is situated today. In the following three columns, we indicate the county, the larger district, and the empire in which these places were situated towards the later 19 th century. It should be noted that, of the places situated in Prussia or Austria-Hungary, we included only those with a large majority of Polish speakers. This was done to avoid placing German-speaking communities in the category of 'today's Poland', as their descendants might later have fled or been moved to Germany after WWII. In the ethnic overlap between Poland, Lithuania, and Belarus, we have been less restrictive. There might be some migration biases later on. We also took care not to include any sources in which some crosschecking by priests or officials might have taken place. In those cases, there was almost no heaping present. We only included county-birth decade averages that were based on at least 50 observations (for the number of cases, see an appendix available from the authors).
Assessing human capital formation with the age-heaping indicator and other measures of human capital
Measuring the production factor 'human capital' has never been simple, as advanced might perhaps be the best option for obtaining reliable insights. This is the rationale for using the age-heaping methodology (as well as comparisons of literacy and schooling, wherever they are available to us). We will explain the advantages and caveats in somewhat greater detail, as the application of this method in economic history is still relatively new.
This approach employs the set of methods that developed around the phenomenon of 'age-heaping'; i.e., the tendency of poorly educated people to round their age 13 erroneously. For example, less educated people are more likely than people with a greater endowment of human capital to state their age as "30," even if they are in fact 29 or 31 years old (Mokyr 1985) .
7 Crayen and Baten (2008) : in all of the countries studied so far that had substantial age-heaping, the correlation was found to be both statistically and economically significant. heaping and literacy, although the relationship was somewhat weaker than for the 19th-or 20th-century data. It is likely that the unavoidable measurement error when using early modern data induced the lower statistical significance.
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The possibly widest geographical sample studied so far has been created by , who were able to include 70 countries for which both ageheaping and schooling data (as well as other explanatory variables) were available. They found in a series of cross-sections between the 1880s and 1940s that primary schooling and age-heaping were closely correlated, with R-squares between 0.55 and 0.76
(including other control variables, see below). Again, the coefficients were shown to be relatively stable over time. This large sample also allowed for the examination of various other potential determinants of age-heaping. To assess whether the degree of bureaucracy, birth registration, and government interaction with citizens is likely to influence the knowledge of one's exact age, independent of personal education, Crayen and Baten used the number of censuses performed for each individual country up to the period under study as an explanatory variable for their age-heaping measure. Except for countries with a very long history of census taking, all of the variations of this variable turned out to be insignificant, which would suggest that such an independent bureaucracy effect was rather weak. In other words, it appears to be the case that societies with a high number of censuses and an early introduction of birth registers had a high degree of age awareness. But those societies also introduced schooling early, and this was the variable 15 that clearly had more explanatory power than the independent bureaucracy effect. Crayen and Baten also tested whether the general standard of living had an influence on ageheaping tendencies (using height as well as GDP per capita as welfare indicators), and found a varying influence: in some decades, there was a statistically significant correlation, while in others there was none.
Was this correlation between numeracy and literacy also visible in Eastern
Europe? When comparing the log literacy in the Russian Imperial census of 1897 for the individuals born between 1825 and 1884 on the vertical axis, and their numeracy levels (see Interestingly, the northeastern districts of European Russia-such as Archangelsk, Wologda, and Perm-were much better in numeracy than they were in literacy. The previous literature has noted that, for literacy development, the existence of schools is even more important than for basic numeracy. For the latter, education in the family contributes more in relative terms. In the thinly populated regions of the northeast, gaining access to schools was much more difficult than in the more densely populated areas farther south.
In conclusion, the correlation between age-heaping and other human capital indicators is quite well established, and the 'bureaucratic' factor does not invalidate this relationship. A caveat relates to other forms of heaping (apart from the heaping on multiples of five), such as heaping on multiples of two, which is quite widespread among children and teenagers and to a lesser extent among young adults in their twenties. 11 This shows that most individuals knew their age as teenagers, but that only in well-educated societies were they are able to remember or calculate their exact age later in life. At higher ages, this heaping pattern was mostly negligible, but it was, interestingly, somewhat stronger among populations who were numerate enough not to round on multiples of five. We will exclude those below age 23 and above 72 since a number of possible distortions affect those specific age groups, leading to age reporting behavior different from that of the adult group in between. Many young males and females married in their early twenties or late teens, when they also had to register as voters, military conscripts, etc. On such occasions, they were sometimes subject to minimum age requirements, a condition which gave rise to increased age awareness. Moreover, individuals in this age group were physically growing, which makes it easier to determine their age with a relatively high accuracy. All of these factors tend to deflate age-heaping levels for children and young adults, compared with the age reporting of the same individuals at higher ages. Because the age-heaping pattern of very old individuals is subject to upward as well as downward bias for the reasons mentioned above, the very old should also be excluded.
There remains some uncertainty about whether age-heaping in the sources contains information about the numeracy of the responding individual, or rather about the diligence of the reporting personnel who wrote down the statements. The age data of the relevant age groups of 23-72 were normally derived from statements from the person himself or herself. However, it is possible that a second party, especially the husband, may have made or influenced the age statement, or even that the enumerator estimated the age without asking the individual. If the latter occurred, we would not be able to measure the numeracy of the person interviewed. In contrast, if the enumerator asked and obtained no response, a round age estimated by him would still measure basic numeracy correctly. A large body of literature has investigated the issue of other persons reporting.
Foldvari et al. (2011) speculated, for example, that wives may appear to have been more numerate than they actually were because they improved their age statement with the help of their husbands. They compared the numeracy of married and unmarried women and found that the latter had significantly lower numeracy in some of their samples.
However, de Moor (2011) recently rejected this view with a number of good arguments.
Moreover, in the early modern period and the 19 th century, marriage was often associated with higher educational and social status, as a number of studies have found (for example, Baten and Murray 1998) . We compared male and female numeracy in our sample, and found that women were sometimes more numerate than men, which would support the hypothesis that they reported their age themselves. On the other hand, there is a correlation between the male and female numeracy of different households. Recently, Friesen et al. (2011) compared systematically the evidence of a gender gap in numeracy and in literacy for the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, and found a strong correlation.
They argued that there is no reason why the misreporting of literacy and age should have yielded exactly the same gap between genders. A more likely explanation is that the wellknown correlation between numeracy and literacy also applies to gender differences. For our study, the question of whether the women answered themselves is slightly less important, because we only seek to estimate average numeracy.
Moreover, there is sometimes direct evidence in the sources that the wives themselves were asked. Manzel et al. (2011) reported finding sources on Latin American
Indio women in which statements like this one were included: "She says that she is 30, but she looks more like 40." Even for black female and male slaves in the Cape Colony in South Africa who were accused of crimes, the legal personnel created a separate column that indicated whether the person was guessing her age, or whether she actually knew. It is possible that, if those Indio and African women, who probably were not shown much respect by colonial officers, were asked for their age; then European women might also have been asked for their age, as the level respect shown to them might have been somewhat greater.
The problem of different enumerators influencing the quality of age statements has also been studied in a 20 th -century context. While a large part of age misreporting indeed arises because the respondents do not know their exact age, this problem is likely to be exacerbated by differences in the quality of the performance of the enumerators, as some of them may have taken their duties more seriously than others (United Nations 1952, 59 ). Referring to the notorious hardships encountered in the surveying processes in contemporary developing countries, Ewbank observed: "In particular, the training of interviewers, their level of education, and their ability to understand and pursue the interests of the researcher will significantly affect the quality of data [on age]" (Ewbank 1981, 15) . However, the difference between the behavior of 20 th -century enumerators and the priests and officials of the 17 th to 19 th century is that the former had much easier access to sources that would enable them to cross-check age statements. Priests of the 18 th century could have looked up birth years in birth registers, but because the registers were usually chronologically sorted, the cross-checking of ages would have required a substantial investment of time. Still, some of the existing sources were clearly crosschecked (yielding ABCC values of around 100 very early), and hence we used a historian's judgment in excluding them. In addition, Szołtysek (2011) found that differences in the age-heaping patterns in historical Poland-Lithuania might be partly amenable to explanation by referring to different organizing principles of the enumeration process inherent to different types of listings.
Of course, a potential bias always exists if more than one person is involved in the creation of a historical source. For example, if literacy is measured by analyzing the share of signatures in marriage contracts, there might have been priests who were more or less interested in obtaining real signatures, as opposed to just crosses or other symbols. We find it reinforcing that previous studies have generally found much more age-heaping (and less numeracy) among the lower social strata, and among the half of the sample population who had lower anthropometric values (Baten and Mumme 2010) . Moreover, the regional differences of age-heaping are similar to the regional differences in illiteracy.
It can be concluded that the method of age-heaping is a useful and innovative tool for assessing human capital.
Results at the regional level and the adjustment of regional biases
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We present the ABCC estimates for the individual regions in Table A .1 in the appendix. 12 On the left side of Table A Table A .2 in the appendix. This adjustment is based on the assumption that the interregional bias was similar in the early period and for the birth decade of the 1820s. This might not have been the case for all of the regions, but in general the estimate will be closer to the true national average after the adjustment than before. The fact that we normally have four to five different regional data sets to compare allows us to gain an impression of the size of measurement error implied by this procedure. For example, in the case of Przemyshlany and the birth decade of the 1730s, the resulting value is clearly too low; also, the Warsaw region might have been underestimated for the 18 th century. But in the vast majority of cases, the regional adjustment procedure works relatively well. In order to remain consistent, we take all of the values into account.
Estimates for the five Eastern European countries and international comparison
In a next step, we generate national estimates based on those regional values. In Figure 5 , we display the regional and national estimates for Russia. Some of the early estimates are above and others are below the estimate for Russia, but the emerging trend seems relatively clear. Hence we show the national trends for all five countries in Figure 6 . We distinguish between the western and eastern parts of today's Poland. The western part is made up of East Silesia and other parts of Prussia (only Polish speakers), as well as of those districts that were annexed by Prussia and Austria-Hungary in the 18 th -century partitions of Poland. The eastern part consists of the regions that were occupied by the Russian Empire. We were curious about whether the west and east would yield similar estimates for the whole of Poland after being regionally adjusted to the national mean. In fact, the similarity of level suggests that this division does not affect the estimates for Poland significantly, even if the variation over time is not identical.
Finally, our aim was to make those series graphically comparable with estimates for other European regions. This was achieved by using the LOWESS procedure, which 22 was previously used by Manzel et al. (2011) . In order to make the comparison, the eastern and western parts of Poland were considered together ( Figure 7 ).
Eastern Europe in international comparison
What broad trends do we obtain from this procedure, and how do they compare with those of other European regions? In Figure 8 , data from Eastern Europe were plotted against the evidence from Western and Southern European countries, which we derived from Stolz et al. 2012 (see also Tollnek and Baten 2011 The relatively large discrepancy between Polish and Russian levels early on, and the much greater dissimilarity of the former in relation to the territories of Belarus, Lithuania, and Ukraine during the 18 th century, are among the major findings here.
Results and Conclusion
Serfdom seems to have played a key role in limiting human capital development in Eastern Europe, as is apparent in the regional patterns we discussed in the digression from the literature review. The earliest evidence we have on western Poland suggests that, in the early 17 th century, the region was not very far behind other regions of Europe.
For example, it displayed a numeracy level similar to those of Portugal and Spain in 1600-49 and 1650-99 (Juif and Baten 2011 Lowess smoother
